Photo by Javad Esmaeili on Unsplash
This article incorporates information and analysis provided by an Iranian historian who requested anonymity.
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The Middle East has entered one of its most volatile moments in decades following the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in a joint United States–Israeli air strike on 28 February 2026. The attack, which reportedly targeted senior Iranian leadership and military infrastructure across the country, marked a dramatic escalation in the confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States.
In the aftermath of Khamenei’s death, the conflict widened into a broader regional confrontation. Iran launched retaliatory missile and drone strikes against Israel and US military installations in the Persian Gulf, while Israeli operations continued against targets inside Iran and allied groups in Lebanon.
Inside Iran, the political future remains deeply uncertain, not least because of mixed signals from the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Two developments in particular intensified the nationwide uprising that had already been gathering momentum. First, during the nation-wide demonstrations in January, Trump publicly urged Iranians to remain in the streets, assuring them that assistance was forthcoming. Many demonstrators interpreted this message as a form of protective backing against security forces long associated with brutal repression.
Emboldened by this perceived support, protesters – who until then had refrained from openly and collectively naming Reza Pahlavi as their leader, constrained by years of fear and the constant threat of arrest – ultimately declared him their sole transitional figure. In doing so, they sought to respond to longstanding Western concerns that the Iranian opposition lacked a unifying alternative to the clerical establishment. Reassured by both the emergence of a named leader and apparent rhetorical backing from Washington, demonstrations multiplied and swelled into the millions across the country.
Alarmed by the scale of the unrest, Khamenei reportedly ordered a full-scale crackdown, described by officials as “sweeping” or “removal” operations. The result, according to opposition accounts, was a massacre in which tens of thousands were killed in two days. Yet despite earlier verbal encouragement from Trump, no direct external assistance materialised. The United States and Israel appeared reluctant to embark immediately on a large-scale intervention. Only after weeks of mobilisation and intelligence gathering did Israeli aircraft reportedly launch precision strikes on 28 February, destroying segments of Iran’s air defence systems and the compound where Khamenei had been meeting senior commanders.
With Khamenei’s death confirmed, attention has turned to the question of succession and transition. Reza Pahlavi has announced a plan for a provisional period aimed at restoring stability and preparing the ground for free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. He has stated that his role would be limited to overseeing this transition, with the Iranian people determining – through a national vote – whether the future system should be a republic or a constitutional monarchy.
Despite this declared framework, Western governments have so far been hesitant to formally recognise Pahlavi’s leadership of what supporters describe as the “National Revolution” or the “Revolution of the Sun and Lion.” The terminology is intended to emphasise the movement’s distinctly Iranian and national character, in deliberate contrast to the regime’s “Islamic Revolution,” which the ruling establishment portrays as a religious project destined to endure indefinitely.
Further uncertainty followed Trump’s recent remarks during a press appearance at the White House alongside the German Chancellor. Asked about Reza Pahlavi’s emergence as a transitional figure, Trump reportedly described him as “not a bad person” but indicated a preference for a “moderate” from within Iran’s existing political structure, drawing a comparison to Venezuela and the handling of Nicolás Maduro. Critics argue that this analogy has heightened anxieties within the Iranian opposition, particularly given the historical record of so-called reformist or moderate currents within the Islamic Republic, which many believe have operated within systemic constraints and at times consolidated rather than diminished hardline authority.
Given the enduring symbolic weight of the Pahlavi name and the visible support among significant segments of the population for Reza Pahlavi’s transitional leadership, some analysts contend that Western governments should reassess their diplomatic posture toward the clerical establishment and clarify their engagement with Iran’s opposition forces.
In the United Kingdom, the Labour government has thus far declined to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation, a stance that critics say places London at variance with some of its partners amid escalating regional tensions and concerns over missile activities and proxy operations in the Persian Gulf.
At the same time, questions have been raised about international media coverage. Some observers argue that outlets such as BBC have at times framed the debate over Iran’s future primarily around figures emerging from within the existing political structure, while giving comparatively limited attention to support for Pahlavi among both domestic protesters and the diaspora.
The proposition that a reformist or moderate faction within the current system could negotiate meaningful change remains a recurring theme in parts of Western analysis. Yet critics maintain that decades of experience – particularly during previous reformist presidencies – suggest that such efforts have generally functioned within entrenched institutional boundaries.
The central question now confronting Washington is strategic clarity: whether its objective is to assist in facilitating a fundamental political transition led by the Iranian people, or to stabilise the situation through the emergence of a reconfigured leadership from within the existing order.
Even if US military operations were to cease and a “moderate” successor within the current framework were accepted internationally, many within the opposition argue that the movement they call the Revolution of the Sun and Lion has reached a point of no return. In their view, the clerical state has lost its social legitimacy, and Iran stands at the threshold of profound and potentially irreversible transformation.
